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ABSTRACT
This article presents a taxonomical framework that supports the considerations of socio-cultural  hazards 
that may affect crowd management in transport hubs, i.e. airports, ports, underground and train stations, 
both in normal and emergency situations. Such hazards include communication breakdowns with pas-
sengers due, for instance, to language barriers; increased potential for revolts, as in stranded passenger 
situations; misreporting of security threats; and uncooperative behaviour in case of emergencies. Such 
socio-cultural hazards are not normally considered from the integrated perspective of transport hub 
operators, e.g. security staff, first responders and service assistants as well as safety and security man-
agers. The present study provides an integrated perspective of these hazards as a means to increase the 
performance of transport staff members that interact with the public and with passengers on a daily 
basis. The methodology used to develop the framework comprises: (i) a focus group with relevant 
experts, (ii) semi-structured interviews at operational facilities with front-end practitioners, and (iii) a 
review of academic literature and media reports. The framework has also been qualitatively corrobo-
rated with transport operators in dedicated interviews and a focus group session. The study identified 
10 socio-cultural hazards that were combined into a single framework comprising three high-level 
sub-categories: (i) crowd–staff interactions, (ii) crowd–crowd interactions, and (iii) crowd–environ-
ment interactions. The framework of socio-cultural factors can increase staff’s awareness of relevant 
socio-cultural hazards, their potential consequences in both normal and emergency situations, and the 
associated mitigation strategies. In turn, this can increase the quality and continuity of service, safety 
and security in the management of members of the public and passengers in transport hubs.
Keywords: crowd management, disruptive passenger behaviour, emergency management, emergency 
preparedness and training, risk and security, socio-cultural hazards, transport hubs.
1 INTRODUCTION
The effective and safe management of the travelling public is an important consideration for 
front-end operators of airports, ports, railways and underground stations. The operators of 
such transport hubs include service personnel (e.g. desk information officers, ticket collec-
tors), security staff (e.g. police, security guards and screeners), and first responders (e.g. fire 
fighters, medical personnel). Collectively, these operators are responsible for monitoring, 
informing, assisting and instructing an enormous flow of passengers of different ages, nation-
alities and cultures, both in normal and emergency situations (e.g. immediate or controlled 
evacuations, stranded passenger scenarios, etc.).
However, ensuring the smooth, secure and safe movement of passengers is not easy. 
 Operators need to be able to address a plethora of needs and expectations of different passen-
gers and crowds, who may also have linguistic difficulties, and, depending on the situation, 
may exhibit strong distress, fear or anger. In particular, transport hub operators need to be 
able to address successfully the variety of socio-cultural hazards (SCHs) that may arise in the 
transport hub.
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SCHs correspond to behaviours of transport hub users and staff that are dysfunctional to 
the effective, secure and safe transit of the public in the hub. Such hazards may include com-
munication breakdowns among passengers and staff due to, for instance, language barriers; 
increased potential for revolts, as in stranded passenger situations; misreporting of security 
threats; as well as uncooperative behaviour in case of emergencies. As their name suggests, 
SCHs have both social and cultural determinants, such as age, gender, education level, social 
status and cultural background. Managing these kinds of behavioural hazards is part of the 
operational demand of front-end operators of transport hubs. Such hazards may be a source 
of stress and discomfort for both staff and passengers, potentially reducing passenger satis-
faction at a given hub. Furthermore, if not adequately mitigated, SCHs may lead to 
interruptions/slowing down of passenger throughput, potential for injury, (safety) equipment 
damage, reputational damage for relevant transport organisations, and potential for legal 
litigation.
SCHs may occur both in normal situations and emergencies. In the former case, SCHs may 
be the triggers themselves of the emergency. This is the situation that may arise, for instance, 
when angry passengers stuck in a transport terminal, exasperated by a long delay following a 
service disruption, behave aggressively with staff, or when passengers of two different cul-
tural groups located in the same terminal start to argue with each other. Although not 
necessarily triggering an immediate health and safety risk, these situations require an ade-
quate intervention by staff in order to ensure/restore continuity of service (i.e., flow of 
passengers in transit) and the security of the involved staff and the other passengers.
In the case of ongoing emergencies—e.g., evacuations, stranded passengers following 
transport service disruptions—SCHs may aggravate emergency consequences. SCHs can in 
fact create the potential for more serious consequences than would have occurred in the 
absence of the SCHs concerned. For instance, communication breakdowns between staff 
members and the public due to language differences may significantly slow down evacuation 
time, and may result in inadvertent discrimination towards some sociocultural groups of pas-
sengers (e.g., less educated, non-English speaking foreigners), which in turn may be more 
likely to suffer higher injuries and casualties. Similarly, the failure of passengers to comply 
with a request to remain in a confined environment during an ongoing emergency (e.g., tech-
nical failure) may result in passengers leaving the assigned area and exposing themselves to 
health and safety hazards. Both situations may result in higher potential for injury and casu-
alties than if the specific SCH not materialised.
The notion of SCHs overlaps with, but is not limited to, the notion of disruptive passenger 
behaviour. This definition captures instances in which passengers may fail to respect good 
rules of conduct (for instance based on staff’s instructions), may disrupt good order and dis-
cipline of operation, and may create a potential safety or security threat [1–3]. Examples of 
disruptive passenger behaviour include, for instance, consumption of narcotics, refusal to 
comply with instructions, sexual abuse, and making threats of any kind towards the crew, 
other passengers and staff [3]. Often associated with alcohol consumption, disruptive passen-
ger behaviour has been especially highlighted in relation to in-flight service, during which 
cabin staff cannot count on external resources (e.g. help from police forces), but have to deal 
with the passenger(s) concerned, at least until the aircraft is on the ground. Cheng-Hua and 
Hsin-Li [4] have however observed that ground service staff should also be prepared to iden-
tify and mitigate such disruptive behaviours, as their occurrence on the ground (e.g. airport 
terminal) is a predictor of their occurrence in the air. Also, incidents linked to disruptive 
behaviour incidents may involve verbal or physical violence. For instance, Hella [5] provides 
a diagrammatic representation showing how passenger behaviour may move from the initial 
408 S. Rozzi, et al., Int. J. of Safety and Security Eng., Vol. 7, No. 3 (2017) 
triggering phase (e.g. luggage dispute, mistreatment by staff), to the following phases of 
escalation, aggression (verbal and/or physical), and return to normal, baseline behaviour. The 
ICAO Doc 9811 [6] adopts a four-level scheme to classify the seriousness of unruly/disrup-
tive passenger behaviour, which ranges from verbally disruptive behaviour (level 1) and 
physical abusive behaviour (level 2), to life-threatening behaviour (level 3) and breach of 
flight crew compartment (level 4).
Implicit in the definition of disruptive passenger behaviour is a focus on misconduct, 
potential for violence and criminal offence, and the need for staff to respond with adequate 
communication and, especially, physical containment actions (e.g. handcuffing). While being 
highly functional to the safety and security of the transport industry, this characterisation 
fails, however, to account for (minor) incidents in which the passenger involved does not 
necessarily intend to create a problem, and in which socio-cultural factors should be consid-
ered – such as in situations involving first-time fliers, or passengers of other nations or culture 
failing to comply with local security regulations.
Indeed, the importance of socio-cultural factors in crisis management has been highlighted 
in studies of natural disasters such as tsunami, earthquakes, hurricanes and floods [7]. In 
particular, such studies highlighted that culture can act both as an enabler of and a barrier to 
effective disaster response. For instance, the positive role of culture towards disaster was 
observed in relation to the Indian Ocean Tsunami. During that event, some communities had 
indigenous knowledge about the manifestation of an imminent tsunami, which enabled them 
to take preventive action (i.e. move away from the sea) and survive, as opposed to migrants 
and tourists who did not have local knowledge [8]. In particular, the communities were aware 
of the signs of an imminent Tsunami: unusual behaviours of birds and animals, and low tide. 
At the same time, culture may play a negative role in effective disaster response. Various 
cases have been reported in the literature regarding communities that refuse to evacuate a 
dangerous area – dangerous, for instance, because of the closeness of a volcano – until 
advised to do so by their local leaders [9]. These instances highlight that cultural background 
influences the behavioural responses to hazards. These considerations are highly relevant for 
transport hubs, which usually accommodates large groups of transit passengers of different 
social and cultural backgrounds, who may react differently to the same instruction, hazard or 
threat.
With these considerations in mind, the present study aims to investigate the potential SCHs 
that may occur in transport hubs. In particular, the study provides a preliminary, qualitative, 
taxonomical framework of SCHs in transport hubs. The goal is to capture the range of SCHs 
that operators of transport hubs may have to confront in normal and emergency situations. 
This knowledge base will help transport hub stakeholders in developing appropriate mitiga-
tions, such as socio-culturally aware risk management models and training programmes. The 
study is organised as follows: the Section 2 will describe the methodology; Section 3, the 
framework; Section 4 will address discussion and conclusions.
2 METHODOLOGY
The framework of SCHs presented in this study was developed by adopting an incremental, 
qualitative, multiple-data collection approach, which is illustrated in the reminder of this 
section. The data collection comprised the following activities:
•  1-day workshop with experts. This was attended by 21 safety and security experts from 
the aviation, maritime, railway and metro domains, and coming from the European Union, 
Turkey and Israel. The workshop took place in November 2015 in Amsterdam. It was 
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organised around two main parts. Part one, familiarisation, briefed experts about the re-
search context, aims and objectives, and preliminary results. Part two, data gathering, 
aimed at collecting expert feedback from participants by means of three group sessions. 
In group sessions 1 and 2, feedback was collected by means of individual questionnaires 
and structured group discussions. The questionnaire items covered the areas of security 
training, risk management practices, communication with passengers, and relevant regula-
tions. The group discussions allowed participating experts to provide further feedback on 
issues not included in the questionnaire (see below) and to report potential socio-cultural 
hazards;
 • 17 Semi-structured interviews with front-end staff. The interviews were conducted over 
the period July 2015–April 2016 during site visits to an airport (n = 1), a high-speed train 
company (n = 2), and railway police (n = 2) facilities in Italy. Personnel interviewed in-
cluded front-end staff such as stewards of high-speed trains, passengers’ assistants, and 
security screeners and police officers. Each interview lasted between 40 min and 1 h. They 
were supported by a 24-item questionnaire organised in four parts: biographical data (n 
of items = 4), problematic passenger groups (n = 8), current security training (n = 6), and 
management of emergency situations (n = 6). The items were open ended to allow for the 
collection of plenty of feedback.
•  Literature and media reviews. Data collection included also a literature review of relevant 
academic articles and media reports. The review focused on the identification of incidents 
between service personnel and passengers in transit at transport hubs.
The collected data was analysed qualitatively in a bottom-up fashion, building on the proce-
dures described in [10, 11]. The first step of the analysis consisted of familiarising the 
researchers with the data, which consisted of notes, visits reports, audio recordings, and inter-
mediate research reports. Then, this data corpus was reviewed in order to identify initial, 
preliminary categories of SCHs that emerged from the interviews, the focus group, and the 
literature review respectively. This process involved numerous judgements about the mean-
ing and the significance of the data examined, and the potential categories of SCHs discussed. 
Subsequently, the preliminary categories of SCHs were systematically compared with each 
other. This comparison led to some of the SCHs being either refined and/or aggregated 
according to similarity into more abstract, generalisable categories of SCHs, or discarded 
because they were insufficiently substantiated by the available evidence. Subsequently, the 
SCHs identified were subjected to two internal revisions in which the research team qualita-
tively checked them for overlaps, completeness, accuracy, and relevance. This process led to 
an initial definition of a total of 17 SCHs.
The initial version of the ECCS framework was subjected to a corroboration cycle in which 
feedback was collected by three operational experts and one safety manager of two Turkish 
airports. While this revision indicated that the framework captured relevant categories of 
SCHs, it was also instrumental in spotting similar categories that could be further aggregated. 
This triggered a further revision of the framework by the research team, which led to the final 
form of the framework: a total of 10 categories of SCHs grouped in three macro categories 
(as will be described in the next section).
3 RESULTS: THE ECCS FRAMEWORK
The SCHs are presented in the context of the Environment, Crowd, other Crowd members 
and Staff (ECCS) framework. ECCS assumes that to understand the SCHs that can arise from 
a multicultural crowd, it is necessary to consider the surrounding context in which the crowd 
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is located. SCHs in transport hubs lie at the interaction between the crowd (C) and the com-
ponents of the surrounding context. Such components include:
•  Staff (S), i.e. the operators that can be found at the front end of large transport hubs. These 
include roles involved in normal day-to-day operations (e.g. screeners, information desk 
assistants, police officers) and first responders (medics, fire-fighters, etc.);
 • Other crowd members (C), i.e. the other crowd members that a person or a group can inter-
act with in a transport hub. Also, interaction with other crowd members may trigger some 
types of cultural-dependent hazardous behaviours, hence why the C component appears 
twice in the model;
•  The environment (E), i.e. the information and the physical space that can be found in the 
transport hub. The public’s experience of transport hub includes the gathering of informa-
tion from various sources, such as aural messages (audio alarms; public messages); digital 
and physical signage; SMS; social-media (Facebook, etc.). Furthermore, passengers have 
to move across the hub layout and may interact with various types of equipment.
It is in the interactions between the pivotal components of the framework – i.e. crowd mem-
bers, and the surrounding contextual components – that one should look at to see the 
occurrence of socio-cultural hazards. SCHs can be found in the staff–crowd interaction; 
crowd–crowd interaction (also called within-crowd interaction); and crowd–environment 
interaction (see Fig. 1). Thus, the ECCS model identifies the interactions between the crowd 
and the different contextual components that may lead to incidents and service interruptions 
in a transport hub. The model and its components are shown in Fig. 1. The pivotal element of 
the model is the crowd, around which the other contextual elements are found. The next sec-
tions describe the SCHs that can be found in these interactions.
Figure 1:  The ECCS model and its components (numbers identify the interactions of the 
model).
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3.1 Crowd–staff interactions
3.1.1 Socio-cultural tensions between staff and crowd members
At least three types of socio-cultural tensions may occur between staff and passengers in 
transport hubs. First, staff may fail to account for the cultural diversity of the passengers they 
have to deal with. In particular, they may fail to provide equal (health care/emergency) assis-
tance/treatment to passengers of different cultures (especially ethnical or racial minorities) 
because of stereotypes and prejudice. Stereotyping can be defined as ‘the process by which 
people use social categories (e.g. race, sex) in acquiring, processing, and recalling informa-
tion about others’ [12]. In general, individuals are frequently not aware of the activation or the 
impact of stereotyping on their perceptions, emotions and behaviour. Stereotype-linked bias 
is an automatic and unconscious process, and can occur even among persons who are not 
outwardly prejudiced [13, 14]. To Jones [15] stereotyped responses of staff can occur espe-
cially in situations characterised by intense time pressure, resource constraints, uncertainty 
and high/cognitive demand, such as emergencies. Ultimately, stereotyping may result in staff 
discriminating against some cultural groups when providing assistance (for instance because 
of religious differences).
Second, staff may inadvertently engage in behaviours considered unacceptable/offen-
sive from the perspective of a passenger of another culture [16]. For instance, tensions 
may arise due to staff improperly handling sacred/personal items at security checks; staff 
using inadequate body language (e.g. a male security officer talking directly to a Mus-
lim woman while ignoring her husband); staff making requests considered unacceptable 
by other cultures (e.g. asking a Sikh to remove his hat in public; asking a Muslim woman 
to remove her head scarf in public; having a Muslim male body searched by a woman 
officer). In general it is important for staff members to realise how their behaviour may 
inadvertently spark incidents with passengers from nationalities and cultures different 
than theirs.
Finally, the staff interviewed reported that another category of tensions concerned the 
interaction with privileged individuals, such as VIPs, politicians and high-ranking individu-
als. Some incidents have occurred in which some of these individuals behaved arrogantly 
towards staff, held unrealistic expectations about the level of service they could expect, or 
refused security checks and procedures (for instance because they did not want to be inspected 
by virtue of their social status). Also, our research participants reported at least one occur-
rence in which a politician on board a high-speed train used his authority to interfere with an 
on-going emergency operation.
3.1.2 Poor communication due to language barriers
Situations may occur in which staff and passengers are unable to understand each other due 
to language barriers. In these situations, the person is unable to articulate own thoughts either 
in the local language spoken by staff or in the relevant international language (e.g. English). 
This SCH may include different kinds of situations, such as, for instance, injured/sick passen-
gers who are unable to report/communicate their own (deteriorating) health conditions; 
passengers unable to report a problem to staff (e.g. threat or hazard observed; missing rela-
tive); passengers misunderstanding staff instructions (e.g. not following the direction assigned 
by staff). Note that this hazard may be exacerbated when staff adopt poor communication 
strategies, such as repeating instructions or questions louder and louder, but without slowly 
articulating words – something that may trigger a defensive response of the concerned pas-
senger, because of fear and/or embarrassment.
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3.1.3 Ineffective reporting of security threats (relative to emergency prevention)
Usually, passengers in transport hubs receive communications about the importance of notic-
ing and reporting to authorities’ items that may pose an immediate security threat, such as 
unattended packages, objects and baggage. However, our research participants reported cases 
in which passengers failed to report such threats effectively. For instance, passengers may fail 
to report a security threat, such as an unattended item, because they either are not aware of 
the threat, or may not perceive reporting it as an obligation. Furthermore, passengers may 
engage in an improper reporting procedure: they may themselves collect a potential threat so 
as to bring it to the police (instead of just calling the police). This latter case was reported 
relative to infrequent travellers, who, while attempting to do something useful, did not realise 
the potential danger they exposed themselves to. Finally, passengers may err on the cautious 
side, and over-report potentially security threats, which in fact turn out to be not dangerous. 
This latter behaviour may increase following the occurrence of a major disaster/terrorist 
attack, which usually enhances the level of alertness of the general public.
3.1.4 Refusing to comply with staff safety instructions (during emergencies)
During emergencies, passengers may fail to comply with staff instructions. For instance, 
passengers may act based on their own initiative. Unauthorised, self-initiated responses may 
be triggered by the increasing sense of danger, especially following a prolonged stay in a 
confined environment. For instance, in the case of the Norman Atlantic ferry disaster in 2015, 
some passengers abandoned the ship due to increased fear of the growing fire, and eventually 
died in deep waters. Again, in an incident mentioned during our interviews, a passenger on 
board a broken-down train, temporary stuck at a station, broke a window to get off without 
staff authorisation, and hence exposed himself to various hazards such as electrocution. 
These behaviours can arise as a consequence of a heightened sense of danger, combined with 
at least two culture-dependent factors such as low trust in authorities and a tendency for 
self-organisation (see e.g., [17, 18]).
Also, familiarity with a particular transport hub may limit compliance with staff instruc-
tions, especially in emergencies. People have mental scripts for navigating through familiar 
environments and use these automatically without conscious thought [19, 20]. Thus, regular 
users of a transport hub, such as commuters, may pay little attention to staff instructions, 
especially if these involve taking unfamiliar paths – such as taking elevators, stairs, or a tun-
nel to escape from a threat (e.g., fire) – and even if these are the quickest and safest ways to 
safety. This was exemplified in the case of the King’s Cross underground station disaster in 
London in 1987, where the majority of the victims had taken the familiar route instead of the 
one instructed by the staff [19]. Overall, these considerations suggest that in transport termi-
nals, familiar users such as commuters may require clear and targeted information to override 
their routine automatic routes, particularly in emergencies.
3.2 Crowd–crowd interactions
3.2.1 Cultural conflicts between individuals/groups belonging to different cultural groups
SCHs may include tensions between passengers belonging to different cultural groups. For 
instance, in an incident reported on the news, an 81-year old woman on an El Al flight from 
New York to Tel Aviv was invited to change seat, after an ultra-orthodox Jew refused to sit 
next to a woman [21]. The incident resulted in the woman concerned suing the airline. It 
seemed that the incident was not a single instance and others were reported to have occurred 
due to sexual discrimination by religious ultra-orthodox Jewish men, eventually causing 
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flight delays [21, 22]. Other examples mentioned by the staff interviewed concerned potential 
conflicts between supporters of different football teams in the same terminal, e.g. train station 
airport. Although cultural difference, per se, is not necessarily the primary cause of conflict 
between groups, culture influences significantly the perceptions according to which cross-cul-
tural conflict is formed [23].
3.2.2 Fighting/revolting for resources (food, space, emergency exists, etc.)
The literature on evacuation and crowd disasters has acknowledged the tension existing 
between the competitive and collaborative behaviour of passengers in emergencies [24, 25], 
and the fact that passengers may positively engage in collaborative behaviour in emergencies, 
for instance by keeping calm and supporting others. However, although less desirable, com-
petitive behaviour may still occur. Passengers may fight for safety equipment during 
emergencies, and may push or even beat other passengers while attempting to evacuate 
quicker [26, 27]. In one of our interviews, a high-speed train steward reported an incident in 
which angry and hungry passengers on board a broken-down train revolted against him and 
other on-board staff in order to find food in the galley.
3.2.3 Crowd–environment interactionPassengers entering restricted areas
This category of SCHs involves passengers entering restricted areas, either inadvertently or 
intentionally. Inadvertent entrance into restricted areas may occur as wayfinding in transport 
hubs can be very demanding, especially for unfamiliar users or infrequent travellers. 
A serious wayfinding failure involves passengers inadvertently entering restricted security 
areas, something that may trigger an alarm and result in the evacuation of the hub (or part of 
it). For instance, on May 2016, at Cologne airport, a 62-year-old Spanish passenger rushing 
to his aircraft inadvertently entered a restricted area of Terminal One [28]. The event trig-
gered a preventive evacuation of the terminal, while police officers searched for explosives, 
and several aircrafts were delayed. A similar security breach in the same airport with similar 
consequences involved a woman who was able to walk through the security screening area 
without being checked [29]. Besides age, familiarity and travel experience, another factor 
that may lead to this SCH is the lack of understanding of symbols across cultures: as Symonds 
succinctly puts it: “people of China does not [necessarily] understand the same symbols as 
American tourists” [30]. Corroborating this point is the observation of one of our research 
participants, a railway police director, who noted that asylum seekers in railways may not 
necessarily be familiar with basic symbols, such as the yellow line next to the rail.
Finally, sometimes passengers intentionally enter into restricted areas, such as rail tracks. 
These may be commuters in a hurry, or immigrants who do not perceive the danger of cross-
ing tracks at railways station.
3.2.4 Unintended misuse of (safety) equipment
This behaviour involves the unauthorised and unjustified use of equipment by passengers who 
are unaware of the consequences or gravity of their actions. For instance, the railways opera-
tors we interviewed reported cases of improper emergency brake activation occurring when 
people accompanying passengers on board a high-speed train realised that the train was leav-
ing the station while they were still on board. When approached by the train steward, the 
people concerned were surprised by the expensive penalty they had to pay. Analogous cases 
have been reported in the airport domain, in which the evacuation slide was unnecessarily 
deployed following the improper opening of a plane door by a first-time flyer, because of rea-
sons such as mistaking an emergency exit for the toilet [31], or attempting to get fresh air 
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before take-off [32]. Overall, the common factor across these types of behaviours is the lack of 
awareness of the consequences, such as delays and potential for injuries, arguably due to poor 
education and lack of familiarity with modern transport systems or a combination of both.
3.2.5 Slow passenger mobilisation during emergencies
While a quick mobilisation of passengers of a transport hub may be needed in certain situa-
tions, e.g. evacuation, there are factors that may hamper this process. First, passengers may 
react differently to public alarms in transport terminals, depending on the level of risk they 
perceive. This may vary according to different socio-demographic parameters, such as gen-
der and age. Men and younger people are generally less risk-adverse than women and older 
people as documented by [33, 34]. Thus, front-end operators have to consider that passengers 
might be more or less willing to evacuate according to their level of risk perception. Second, 
different passenger crowds may move at different speeds. Crowd walking speed might vary 
depending on several socio-demographic parameters, such as gender, age and group forma-
tion [35]. For instance, men walk faster than women, and adults and children walk faster than 
the elderly. People also walk more slowly when they are with others than when they are 
alone. Furthermore, as reported by [36], dress length also has a direct influence on people 
walking speed. These findings suggest that transport hub operators should be aware that 
crowds should not be treated as a collection of similar individuals.
3.2.6 Misuse of social media information during emergencies
Our research participants stressed that during an emergency, users of the transport hub may 
publish incorrect, partial, or incomplete information on social media, which may generate 
unjustified panic. Furthermore, young people sometimes record the emergency situation on 
their mobile phones instead of escaping from the danger and evacuating safely. This finding 
is indeed supported by a video analysis of Robinson and Cichomska (available in [37]) about 
the terrorist attack at Brussels airport.
4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
SUMMARY
This study has identified 10 socio-cultural hazards (SCHs) that may occur in transport hubs. 
SCHs correspond to behaviours of members of the public in transit (and staff) that are dys-
functional to the efficiency, safety and quality of operations, and that therefore need to be 
addressed by front-end operators. SCHs may occur both during normal situations and during 
emergencies. In the former case, they may trigger incidents; in the latter case, they may add 
to the chaos and uncertainty of emergency operations, thus increasing their negative conse-
quences. The framework of SCHs provides a means for front-end operators to identify and 
discuss issues they encounter in their interactions with the public.
The SCHs identified were formed into a framework comprising three high-level areas – 
crowd–staff, crowd–crowd, and crowd–environment interactions. These three areas capture 
the fact that SCHS in transport hubs can be found in the interaction between individuals or 
groups in the crowd and the other elements of the surrounding context: staff members, other 
crowd members, and the information and physical environment.
4.1 Practical value of the framework
The ECCS framework has potential pragmatic value. It can enhance current transport hub 
safety and security risk assessment by prompting analysts to consider relevant categories of 
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behavioural hazards that can impact substantially the risk profile of a given hub – either 
because they can trigger a crisis, or because they can greatly influence the consequences 
associated with an existing one. Also, the framework can become part of training packages 
for front-end operators of transport hubs. The framework can be used to sensitise operators 
regarding potential hazardous behaviours that may arise from the public in transport hubs, 
and their potential consequences in both normal and emergency situations. Indeed, the effec-
tive mitigation of SCH requires awareness and anticipation of them by front-end operators, 
as well as the use of adequate socio-cultural mitigations. To this end, the research team is 
currently developing a training package that aims to increase operators’ intercultural skills, 
cross-cultural sensitivity, ability to cope with cultural differences, and awareness of cross-cul-
tural differences in crowd behaviours as well as verbal and non-verbal communication skills, 
both one-to-one and one-to-many. Such skills are not necessarily covered by existing manda-
tory training programmes. Usually, these tend to cover the technical, procedural and regulatory 
aspects of the work, while providing limited coverage of the potential issues that may arise 
when interacting with members of the public. Yet, knowledge of these SCHs is part of the 
background of the more senior staff members [4], and is essential to contribute to safe and 
effective task performance both during normal and emergency situations.
Overall, the methodological approach taken ensured that the SCHs identified by the study 
were heavily based on the accounts of relevant research participants. As discussed in Section 
2, these included both back-end as well as front-end roles from the airport, railways, under-
ground and maritime domains. This provided a relevant knowledge base which was 
triangulated with relevant academic literature and incidents reported in the media. Further-
more, an initial corroboration was obtained from a small-sample of four airport staff. Despite 
this, the framework can benefit from at least two types of future studies: (i) studies that will 
seek further corroboratory feedback from experts of other transport domains about dimen-
sions such as the relevance, completeness, and correctness of the ECCS framework; and (ii) 
studies that will deepen the understanding of viewpoints of members of the public involved 
in SCHs, for instance through in-depth interviews and ethnographic observations of passen-
gers in transport hubs. In turn, these efforts are expected to increase the validity and the 
generalisability of the framework.
Finally, note that, while the framework has essentially stressed the undesirable behaviours 
that may arise from the interaction of the public and the transport hub, previous research 
indicates that members of the public may also play a positive role in emergency management. 
Therefore, it is anticipated that the public may be considered a resource in the development 
of the socio-cultural mitigations. Thus, the authors advocate that the ECCS framework be 
extended or complemented with an analogous taxonomy of the positive behaviours that can 
be played by the public in transport hubs, in normal as well as in emergency situations.
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